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Elected Police and Crime Commissioners: some caution is
certainly required
Tim Newburn analyses the impact of elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). He
argues that although there is an undeniable potential for enhanced democratic input into
policing, police alone are not a magic bullet for solving crime and the distance between
PCCs and local government is an issue, amongst many others, of which to be cautious.
We f ind ourselves on the cusp of  the most signif icant ref orm of  police governance in
England and Wales f or half  a century. The Police Ref orm and Social Responsibility Act
2011 introduces directly elected ‘Police and Crime Commissioners’ (PCCs) with very
substantial powers over policing. They will have
responsibility f or the maintenance of  their local
constabulary, f or ensuring that it is ef f icient and
ef f ective, as well as holding the chief  constable to
account f or the exercise of  a range of  duties.
Crucially, the PCC will also be responsible f or
appointing and dismissing the chief  constable and f or
agreeing the appointments of  deputy and assistant
chief  constables. These powers are held by the Mayor
in London.
Under the new arrangements each local area will also see the establishment of  a Police and Crime Panel
(PCP), with a minimum of  10 and a maximum of  20 members. All local authorit ies in the relevant area will
have at least one councillor representative on the PCP.
What should we make of  these ref orms? Many claims have been made, not least that they will help
‘reconnect’ police and public, that they should empower the public to hold the police to account, and that
they will mean that the public will have someone ‘on their side’ in the f ight against crime and anti-social
behaviour. Or, as the Conservative Party election manif esto put it in 2010, the ref orms were expected to
bring greater democratic involvement in policing. Indeed, over the years commentators and crit ics on both
the lef t and the right of  the polit ical spectrum have called f or greater ‘democratic policing’. But whilst the
term is easy to conjure up and to use in support of  a variety of  actual or potential policy init iative, rarely
is there much clarity as to how the term is being used. In short, how do we judge if  policing is more or
less ‘democratic’?
I want to suggest that in thinking about PCCs and their potential impact on ‘democratic policing’ that we
use seven principles as the core criteria (This draws directly on work that Trevor Jones, David Smith and
I did some years ago tit led Democracy and Policing). These are: widespread participation in polit ical
decisions; responsiveness of  policy to representative bodies; information to f orm a basis f or decision-
making by representatives; an even distribution of power between dif f erent actors in the system; the
possibility of  redress; effective delivery of outputs, such as order maintenance, crime prevention, and
prosecution; and, f inally, a concern with equity, f rom which the other six spring.  Speculatively – given that
the f irst PCC elections don’t occur until this coming November, I’ll take each in turn.
Participation
This is the primary argument generally used in f avour of  PCCs. However, current indications suggest
public knowledge of  the f orthcoming elections is slight, and there are f ears that turn out will be low.
Indeed, it is debateable anyway whether the opportunity to vote f or a PCC once every f our years or so
will amount to meaningf ul participation in the process of  local police policymaking. In short, whilst
participation remains important, theref ore, there are good reasons f or thinking that other ‘democratic
values’ are at least as signif icant in this context.
Equity
Whereas policing always involves striking a balance between competing and of ten conf licting demands,
there is still lit t le mature public discussion about the emphasis that should be given to dif f erent policing
objectives or policing methods). One potentially posit ive ef f ect of  PCCs could be to bring such tensions
out into the open. Alternatively, there is a danger that PCC elections might provoke lowest common
denominator ‘majoritarianism’, in which the police are pressured to respond to the demands of  one
section of  the voting public at the expense of  others. The relatively recent successes of  extremist
parties such as the BNP in local elections are a reminder that we should not assume that ‘participation’
necessarily leads to progressive ref orm.
Delivery of service
Every cit izen benef its if  policing is ef f ectively and ef f iciently delivered. The principle of  ef f ective service
delivery f lows f rom the principle of  equity, since a well-policed society is more just than a badly-policed
one. The PCCs will be a new source of  pressure on the police to show that they are achieving results in
ways that matter to the electorate. PCCs may well be a good thing, but the key issue will be what ‘counts’
as good perf ormance. To be truly ef f ective PCCs will need to resist the temptation to play to the gallery,
and will need to def end those aspects of  policing which are least easy to measure, or may be relatively
invisible to the voting public.
Responsiveness
Elected commissioners are clearly intended to make the police more responsive. They f ace dif f icult ies
however f or policing is both inf luenced by immediate demands and expectations and also plays an
important role in shaping such expectations and demands. One danger is that certain f orms of  crime may
be excluded f rom regular or serious police attention, and whilst PCCs may play an important role, much
will depend on their willingness to expose otherwise submerged public demands.
Distribution of power
The concentration of  power among a f ew individuals or groups is inimical to democracy. By shif t ing at
least some power away f rom central government and police chief s, in theory the introduction of  PCCs
aids the distribution of  power. Indeed, in the broader context of  the recent abolit ion of  national league
tables and perf ormance targets (as announced in mid-2010), the PCC ref orms do present a real attempt
to shif t the locus of  power over policing away f rom the centre. That said, with responsibilit ies covering
huge geographical areas there will clearly be limits on the extent to which ‘local’ inf luence is enhanced by
these ref orms.
Information
There is wide agreement across the polit ical spectrum that good inf ormation is needed f or the
achievement of  all other democratic objectives. Routine inf ormation is insuf f icient, however, and it is
important that there are alternative and independent means of  interrogating the police service about their
actions. The PCC should be able to perf orm this f unction and consequently give more impetus to the
demand f or more and better inf ormation, building on posit ive recent advances such as the introduction
of  crime data and local ‘crime maps’ (introduced in early 2011).
Redress
The possibility of  redress is integral to democracy. This context is probably best seen as the capacity to
remove an incompetent or malevolent police management, together with the capacity to reverse policies
that unf airly target particular groups and to right wrongs done to individuals by the police. PCCs will be
the f irst local representatives to have the power to dismiss the chief  of f icer and this clearly strengthens
local capacities. In relation to PCCs, what is less clear is the extent to which they will be able to make an
important dif f erence in relation to redress at levels below senior management.
Where does this leave us?
There is undeniable potential in these ref orms f or enhanced democratic input into policing in England and
Wales, not least because of  the shif t in inf luence away f rom Whitehall and towards ‘local’ areas. At the
same time, some caution is also required. PCCs add f urther complexity to an already convoluted system
of  police governance and f or all the talk of  local democracy in one sense PCCs are just the latest in a
long sequence of  attacks on local government. In terms of  impact on crime, PCCs will have litt le leverage
over local issues such as education, employment, housing and others that arguably have a signif icant
inf luence on local crime and order. As such, much of  the rhetoric surrounding PCCs repeats the common
misconception that the police alone can be the magic bullet controlling crime or, indeed, that this is their
core mission.
Perhaps the most important question to be asked about the ref orms is whether they will ult imately
contribute to increased insecurity, making crime seem a more and more serious problem, and available
solutions less and less convincing, or whether they will open a window onto a wider view and of f er the
prospect of  a more deliberative and constructive debate. Whilst it is important to keep an open mind,
there are two signif icant sources of  concern. First, current indications (a recent YouGov poll f or Victim
Support f ound that f ewer than half  of  all respondents knew of  the f orthcoming PCC elections) and
historic precedents (police-community consultative groups f or example) suggest that only a small
minority of  people will be prompted to ‘participate’  -  either by voting or by becoming involved in other
f orums – in PCC-related activity. Furthermore, the entrenched nature of  party polit ical competit ion over
crime issues, the overly narrow def init ion of  policing and its f unctions currently being used, and the
distance between PCCs and local government, all restrict the likelihood of  a largely posit ive outcome; an
outcome which stimulates usef ul, well- inf ormed and constructive debate, grounded in a mature
appreciation of  the real issues and realistic options f acing local communities.
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